Create a United Nations Genocide
Prevention Focal Point and Genocide Prevention Center
By Prof. Gregory Stanton, Ph.D., President,
Genocide Watch
Coordinator, The
International Campaign to End Genocide
Background:
Genocide is not
conflict. It is one-sided mass
murder. Jews had no conflict with
Nazis. Armenians posed no threat to
Turks. Ukrainian farmers did not fight
Stalin’s communist cadres. Bengalis did
not try to massacre Pakistanis. Hutu intellectuals did not rise up against the
Tutsi army in Burundi in 1972, nor did Tutsis advocate mass murder of Hutus in
Rwanda in 1994. Yet all of these groups were victims of genocide. Conflict resolution is not genocide
prevention.
Politicides, political mass murders, are also not the result of
conflict. Nor are they the result of “state failure.” Instead, they result from state success, from
too much state power, from state-ism. The
mass murders of the Soviet gulags could not have been prevented by conflict
resolution. The man-made famines in China,
Cambodia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and North Korea could not have been prevented by
diplomacy or humanitarian relief.
Since the founding of the
United Nations in 1945, there have been at least 55 genocides and politicides. Over seventy
million people have died, most murdered by their own governments, more than in
all the wars combined. Genocide, unlike
other human rights violations, can almost never be prevented or punished unless
the government that perpetrates the crime is forcefully restrained or overthrown.
That is why the United
Nations has been ineffective in preventing genocide. The U.N. is an association of states,
represented by governments that wave the flag of national sovereignty whenever
anyone challenges their “domestic jurisdiction,” which many of them believe
includes what Leo Kuper called the “sovereign right
to commit genocide.”[1] Many
reports (Whitaker, 1985; Carlsson, 1999; Brahimi, 2000) have recommended creating U.N. early warning
and response institutions to prevent genocide.
None have been implemented. At
first paralyzed by the great power veto during the Cold War, the U.N. is now
paralyzed by unwillingness of great powers to subject their policies to
criticism and fear among illegitimate governments that scrutiny of their human
rights violations might invite intervention by international forces.
Nevertheless, the United
Nations remains the best hope to overcome the idolatry of national sovereignty,
in favor of the popular sovereignty advocated by Locke, Rousseau, and Jefferson.
An
underlying premise of the Genocide Convention is that any regime that commits
genocide forfeits its legitimacy, and should be subject to the authority of
international law and international intervention. The U.N. Security Council has the
responsibility to protect against threats to international peace and
security. Rwanda and Bosnia should teach
the world that genocide is never simply an “internal matter.” Genocidal regimes never stop their predatory murders
at their own borders and always hemorrhage refugees. As Lemkin
emphasized, genocide is a crime against all of humanity because it permanently
reduces the cultural diversity that is humanity’s heritage.[2]
Genocides and politicides are political processes. Early warning theory has made progress in
identifying factors that lead to genocide.
Some models are multi-factorial and statistical. They provide support for general policies like
democracy building. However, such models
usually do not prescribe specific tactics to stop genocides. Genocide Watch has developed a processual model that can be logically understood by policy
makers and is more specific about warning signs and tactics to stop each stage
of the genocidal process. “The Eight
Stages of Genocide” are Classification, Symbolization, Dehumanization, Organization,
Polarization, Preparation, Extermination, and Denial. (See http://www.genocidewatch.org/8stages.htm
)
What structures exist in the U.N. now for early
warning and early response to genocide?
The Department of Political
Affairs (DPA) Prevention Team works with regional divisions and desk officers
to study cases likely to become emergencies requiring U.N. intervention. The most serious, including potential
genocides, are referred to the Interdepartmental Framework for Coordination
Team, which now has members from thirteen departments and agencies including DPA, DPKO, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCHR, FAO, UNHCR,
UNICEF, WFP, WHO, DESA, DDA, ILO, World Bank and IMF. Since 1998, monthly meetings in New York have focused on early warning and
prevention. All members of the Framework Team can bring situations that may
result in conflict or other emergencies to the attention of the Team. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
in Geneva has a representative in New York, but no staff members in Geneva
focus solely on genocide prevention.
What problems are there with the current system?
q
The Secretary-General
and Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs are rarely informed of
strategies recommended by the Framework for Coordination Team. Most follow-up is handled at a lower level,
without reaching the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, where the Under-Secretaries-General
could give them political clout.
q
No Assistant-Secretary-General
is a designated Focal Point for Genocide Prevention.
q
The Department of
Political Affairs lacks sufficient personnel who are experts in genocide early
warning. Budget constraints make hiring
additional U.N. staff unlikely.
q
The significant
differences between genocide and other threats to peace and security are not
generally recognized in the U.N. or by member states.
q
Recommendations of
the Framework Team lack adequate follow-up.
U.N. departments lack adequate human resources and budgets to implement long-term
strategies.
q
Responding to
genocide requires great political will by U.N. staff and by member states. Those who push for action may risk their U.N.
careers. Inaction has few career costs.
What are solutions to the problems with this system?
q
The Secretary-General
should name a Special Representative for Genocide Prevention in the Department
of Political Affairs and make that person the Genocide Prevention Focal Point
in the United Nations system. The Special Representative would have
responsibility for warning the Interdepartmental Framework for Coordination Team
of potentially genocidal situations, developing options for responses, and
following up on decisions.
q
The Special
Representative will have to be a skilled diplomat with considerable U.N.
experience, yet one willing to challenge U.N. bureaucratic conservatism. He or she will need courage, and both expertise
in and commitment to genocide prevention.
q
The Special
Representative should be located in New York and report directly to the Secretary-General
and to the Security Council, where political decisions are made.
q
A Genocide
Prevention Center to support the work of the Special Representative for
Genocide Prevention should be established.
q
The Center would
communicate with a global network of governments, international organizations,
and NGO’s dedicated to early warning and effective response. It would be located near the U.N. and have a
professional staff. It would be funded
by voluntary contributions of governments and foundations.
What obstacles might these solutions face?
q
New York U.N. Secretariat
staff may see this new position as a threat to their comfortable relationships with
member states’ representatives and an admission of the U.N.’s failures to
prevent genocide. They may try to get the Special
Representative (SRSG) position relegated to Geneva under the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, several steps removed from political
decision-making.
q
U.N. member
states that repress minorities and defend unlimited national sovereignty will
strongly resist creation of this position, and may refuse to cooperate with the
SRSG.
q
The G-77 majority
in the General Assembly may refuse to appropriate the budget needed to hire the
SRSG. This doomed the Office for Research and Collection of Information, closed
by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali just before the
1990’s genocides.
q
Reports of the
Genocide Prevention Center might be blocked if they criticize member states. Resistance
to “intelligence gathering” by the U.N. has blocked the Brahimi
Report’s recommended Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS). Opponents seem to prefer the current
situation where only a few rich nations can afford to maintain international
intelligence organizations, leaving the rest of the world in the dark about
clandestine plans for genocide. (Rwanda
in 1994 was a case in point.)
How can these obstacles be overcome?
q
A global public
campaign may be necessary to get the Secretary-General to appoint a Special
Representative for Genocide Prevention. The
world’s political leaders must be made to understand that “we, the peoples of
the United Nations,” will no longer accept the excuse that our governments and
the U.N. “didn’t know.” To prevent genocide, the most racist of crimes, the
United Nations must enlist the whole human race. We will need an international movement to end
genocide that has the size and moral force of the anti-slavery movement.
q
This
international campaign will need to engage every government, international
organization, church, mosque, temple, and synagogue, every jurists’
association, conflict transformation organization, and women’s group, and all
of civil society. The campaign cannot
succeed without the leadership and the legitimacy of the United Nations.
q
The Genocide
Prevention Center should be independent, but with a special relationship to the
SRSG. It could then provide the
political advocacy that would be outside the role of the U.N. Secretariat. Such independence is vital to effective early
warning and response.
q
Regional
organizations, human rights groups, humanitarian relief, academic, faith based,
and civil society organizations could provide valuable assistance to the
Special Representative, his or her staff, and to the Genocide Prevention
Center. They could provide field resources and a network with U.N. staff around
the world to provide early warnings of genocide.
q
The position of
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Genocide Prevention should
be created by the Secretary-General under his Article 99 power to report to the
Security Council any threats to international peace and security. It need not be authorized by either the
Security Council or the General Assembly.
However, a resolution by the Security Council would help pave the way
for its creation.
q
The budgets for
the SRSG for Genocide Prevention and for the Genocide Prevention Center could
be raised from contributions by U.N. member states and foundations, including the
Trust Fund for Preventive Action and the United Nations Foundation. The Special Representative and Genocide
Prevention Center staff could be seconded by member governments and other
organizations.